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From co-actionality to extended intersubjectivity: Drawing on language 
change and ontogenetic development 
 
Abstract:  
This paper combines research results centred on theory of mind (ToM) from cognitive and 
developmental psychology (e.g. Goldman 2006; Wilkinson & Ball 2012; Apperly 2010) with the 
notion of intersubjectivity in usage-based linguistics (i.a. Verhagen 2005; Traugott 2012; Nuyts 
2012). It identifies some of the controversies in the literature from both domains and suggests the 
desiderata for a hybrid approach to intersubjectivity, which is distinctively designed to tackle applied 
research in social and cognitive sciences. This model is based on a mismatch between interaction as 
mere ‘co-action’ vs interaction as spontaneously communicated awareness of an(other) mind(s). It 
provides a case study centred on the first language acquisition of pre-nominal usage of this/that and 
such. From respectively a distinctive collexeme (Gries and Stefanowitsch 2004a) and behavioural 
profile analysis (Gries 2010) will emerge that beyond expressions of joint attention, children ToM 
ability progressively underpins ‘ad-hoc’ generalised instantiations based on extended 
intersubjectivity (E–I), viz. the socio-cognitive skill to problematise what a general persona would 
act, feel or think in a specific context. 
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This paper aims at combining experimental research centred on theory of mind (ToM) from cognitive 
psychology (e.g. Premack & Woodruff 1978; Goldman 2006; Apperly 2010) with the notion of 
intersubjectivity in usage-based linguistics (i.a. Verhagen 2005; Traugott 2012; Nuyts 2012). It 
highlights some of the strengths and weaknesses in the literature from both domains and suggests the 
desiderata for a gradient and cross-disciplinary approach which can be applied in a number of 
neighbouring disciplines, e.g. cognitive psychology, forensic and social sciences. The present case-
study is centred on ontogenetic L1 data from the CHILDES1 database. It proposes an operational 
distinction between the ‘behaviour-oriented’ notion of co-actionality (cf. Reich 2011; Author 2016a, 
2017b) and the ‘ToM-oriented’ one of intersubjectivity. Co-actional behaviour underpins target-
                                               
1  The CHILDES is a corpus serving as a central repository for first language acquisition data. It now has contents 
(transcripts, audio, and video) in 26 languages from 130 different corpora, all of which are publicly available worldwide 
(http://childes.talkbank.org, last accessed 23/07/2017). 
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oriented joint projects (i.a. Clark 1996) involving at least 2 agents and may be performed without 
marked functions signalling Speaker/writer’s (Sp/w) awareness of Addressee/reader’s (Ad/r) 
emotions or beliefs. It is no secret that communication occurring as co-actional engagement is 
possible in both low and high levels of the autistic spectrum (e.g. Happe 1995; Grant, Riggs & 
Boucher 2004; Bowler & Benton 2005). Similarly infants and children younger than 3-4 are able to 
engage in dialogic and/or behavioural activities involving joint attention before being able to pass 
false-belief tests (e.g. O’Neill 1996; Moll & Tomasello 2007). In light of this, the present paper 
proposes a new applied corpus-based approach addressing ToM as a gradient mechanism, shifting 
from mere co-actional joint attention to more inferential construing of specific and/or general 
personas’ minds. 
 This study is structured as follows: section 2 focuses on ToM as it is traditionally described 
and enquired in cognitive psychology. Section 3 looks at the similar notion of intersubjectivity and 
the way this concept has been addressed in the linguistics literature. Section 4 suggests the desiderata 
for a hybrid approach to ToM which could combine experimental findings from from cognitive 
psychology together with a corpus-based methodology drawing on language change and ontogenetic 
development. In the same section I will propose an operational distinction between the behaviour-
based notion of co-actionality and the more complex one of intersubjectivity. Section 5 is finally 
centred on a case study shedding light on the gradient formation of ToM in language change and 
ontogeny. A corpus-based enquiry of this, that and such from the English section of the CHLDES 
corpus provides evidence about the semasiological and ontogenetic shift from co-actionality to 
different construals of intersubjectivity. The computational modelling of this study combines 
distinctive collexeme methods (cf. Gries and Stefanowitsch 2004a) in sections 5.4 and 5.5 with a 
more holistic behavioural profile analysis (e.g. Gries 2010; Gries & Otani 2010; Jansegers & Gries 
201) in section 5.6.   
 
2. Theory of Mind in Cognitive psychology  
 
Theory of mind (ToM) refers to the ability to problematise another person’s mental states. In the 
literature in cognitive psychology it is generally agreed that neurotypical children around of 4 tend to 
be able to ‘read’ other people’s minds to their decisions, e.g. making assumptions about people’s 
knowledge, beliefs, feelings and intentions in order to interpret their behaviour ( Onishi & 
Baillargeon, 2005; Kovács Téglás, & Endress 2010; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007). Most of 
research from cognitive psychology during the last 3 decades has relied heavily on different versions 
of so-called ‘‘false-belief’’ tasks (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985; Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987; 




“Before Sally leaves for lunch, she hides her ball in the basket. While she is away eating, her big 
sister Anne plays a trick on her and moves her ball from the basket to the box. When Sally returns, 
where will she look for her ball? To succeed on the task, the participant needs to attribute a belief to 
Sally that she (falsely) believes the ball is in the basket and, on the basis of that false belief, will 
search in the basket, not in the box where the ball is really located and where the participant actually 
knows it to be. While many find this task trivial, not every-one passes: children who are 3years old 
or younger (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001) and children with autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) 
fail to attribute a false belief, answering that Sally will search where the object really is, not where 
she thinks it is. Explaining these developmental and neuropsychological findings turns on 
understanding how the underlying neurocognitive mechanisms work”.  
(Cohen et al 2015: 50) 
 
Based on the above, research focusing on ToM has not been moving beyond slight variations of a 
well established experimental paradigm (again, different versions of ‘lab-bound’ false-belief and 
perspective-taking task; trait judgments; social animations; judgments on photos of eyes or other non-
verbal material). It is undeniable that this ‘stimuli-driven’ approach informed a heated debate about 
the nature of ToM (cf. Goldman 2006) and the developmental stage in which a ToM is acquired 
during ontogeny. However, much of the existing studies provide conflicting results concerning a 
number of issues: e.g. the phenomenological nature of ToM (whether based on a simulation or a folk-
psychological theorising mechanism), the stage in which ToM emerges during ontogenetic 
development (e.g. roughly at the age of 4 or 2 years earlier?), whether a differentiation between 
implicit and explicit ToM is reasonable (e.g. Perner & Ruffman 2005;  Butterfill & Apperly 2013) 
and how does it intersect with autism (cf. Stich & Nichols 1997; Apperly et al. 2008; Apperly 2010; 
Wilkinson & Ball 2012 for specific overviews of the ToM ‘impasse’). In some cases these 
controversies are due to experimental limitations in distinguishing between behaviour-based vs 
mental state-based mechanisms of action monitoring (cf. Apperly 2010). For instance, different 
versions perspective-taking tasks do not clarify whether 2 years old infants are able to predict the 
incoming action of an agent with a false-belief due to an ‘implicit’ understanding of the agent false-
beliefs or simply due to behavioural cues linking an agent to a subsequent action (cf. Perner & 
Ruffman 2005: 215; Piovinelli & Giambrone 1999; Penn & Piovinelli 2007). Equally important, the 
very setting of experimental labs is itself an inhibitor for addressing ToM as a gradient phenomenon, 
as the experimenter is unavoidably him/herself ‘an-other mind’.  
 The above are among the reasons why it is agreed that new desiderata to address ToM in 
cognitive psychology are needed (e.g. Apperly 2010; Wilkinson & Ball 2012; Schaafsma et al. 2015), 
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as ToM cannot be merely tested through simulation tasks and being implicitly treated as a spectator-
based theory. This paper stresses the importance to observe ToM as a mechanism that occurs 
spontaneously during an interaction, intersecting with spatial and contextual conditions (e.g. whether 
the speaker knows the addressee; whether s/he is in his/her presence; whether s/he is accounting for 
a specific or general 3rd party; whether the addressee is being involved in a co-action or is simply a 
listener, and so on). 
 
3. Intersubjectivity in pragmatics and cognitive linguistics  
 
All the above being said about the experimental model in ToM, linguistic research on intersubjectivity 
is also a matter of controversial debate. The intersubjective paradigm in linguistics is presently still 
far from providing a consistent distinction between speakers’ marked intentions to problematise the 
emotions/beliefs of other minds and propositional meanings that inherently include a deictic 
positioning of the speaker with respect to other personas in space. As an illustration, deictic elements 
such as this or that semantically encode joint attention among interlocutors (cf. Ferrari & Sweetser 
2012). This naturally leads to the question of whether spatial deictics should be considered as markers 
of intersubjectivity. In some accounts the answer is indeed positive (e.g. Diessel 2006; Breban 2010; 
Ghesquierre et al. 2012). However, this view is perhaps debatable when addressed from a cross-
disciplinary perspective, as 1-2 year old infants do learn and actively use deictics before being able 
to pass ToM false-belief tasks. Intersubjectivity in the linguistics’ literature is an extremely 
productive domain of research, yet it is defined, re-defined and re-interpreted depending on the 
authors dealing with it (i.a. Langacker 1991; Traugott 2003; Ghesquiere & Van de Velde 2011).  
 Concerning the intersection between interlocutors’ mutual awareness and spatial deixis 
Langacker (1987, 1990, 1991) suggests that the use of pronouns such as I, we, or you have the function 
of foregrounding the speaker’s communicative setting (what he defines as the ground) to identify the 
referent. In his approach, the conceptualisers’ awareness of the here-and-now of the speech event can 
be semantically encoded by deictics that implicitly establish spatial relationships among speakers and 
objects. Similarly, demonstratives and determining elements like such and zulk are elsewhere also 
considered intersubjective, serving to create a “joint focus of attention” (Diessel 2006: 465) by which 
the speaker negotiates discourse referent tracking for the hearer (Ghesquière 2009, Ghesquire & Van 
de Vede 2011).  
 Both Langacker’s implicit account of the ground and the ‘joint-attention approach’ differ 
considerably from Traugott’s diachronically informed definition of intersubjectivity, which she 
distinctively connects to meanings coding attention to the social self of the hearer (e.g. Traugott & 
Dasher 2002). In Traugott’s model, less-intersubjective constructions tend to progressively develop 
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new polysemies with new intersubjectified functions. Discourse marking (DM) uses of actually or in 
fact are intersubjective as they mark not only connectivity between p and q, but also function as a 
“DM hedge” to soften or mitigate what is said and acknowledge the addressee’s actual or possible 
objections.  
 Verhagen (2005, 2007) proposes an alternative account of intersubjectivity specifically 
addressing cognitive coordination between speaker and hearer. An intersubjective construction 
foregrounds the hearer as active interpreter and conceptualiser of utterances of the speaker. This is 
the case of connectives such as but or moreover, which can be adopted to accommodate Ad/r’s 
projected expectations through an interaction. 
 Nuyts (2001a, 2001b, 2012) holds another view on intersubjectivity which involves modal 
meanings “presented as being shared between the assessor and a wider group of people, possibly (but 
not necessarily) including the hearer” (Nuyts 2012: 58) as for constructions such as it is likely, 
unfortunately and so on. Drawing on that, Author (2013, 2017a) distinguishes meanings that are 
specifically aimed at addressing the Ad/r’s potential reactions to what is said, from meanings that 
include a more or less general 3rd party, who conceptually functions as the social bearer of the 
utterance. The former are defined as immediate intersubjective (I-I) and diachronically precede 
further reanalysed functions encoding extended-intersubjectivity E-I. A case of I-I construction is the 
discourse marker (DM) actually when it specifically encodes Sp/w's awareness of a specific 
interlocutor: 
 
(1) [pointing at a window] 
 Actually, I wouldn’t mind it staying open cos I’m a bit hot.  
(BNC F7G 509)  
(Author 2017: 95) 
 
With the employment of actually Sp/w prevents Ad/r from disagreeing with the proposition, with an 
implied attempt to mitigate it. It could be paraphrased as Aware of what you might say, I am telling 
you p. This is a case where Sp/w ‘reacts’ to Ad/r’s action (the opening of the window), with the 
awareness that ‘sufficient shared understanding’ (cf. Linell & Lindstrom 2016) with Ad/r needs to be 
negotiated. Here the intersubjective awareness conveyed by actually in (1) does not exceed the here-
and-now of the conversation. Consider now the case of actually in (2) below: 
 
(2) They had to perhaps give up their pots and pans, or they were supposed to.  
 Actually, a remarkably few were collected, to provide brass for armaments. 
(BNC KRN 119)  
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(Author 2017: 93) 
  
This usage of actually is an instance of a more extended form of intersubjectivity. Formally, it still 
functions as a discourse marker (DM), as it appears dislocated to a clause-periphery position (cf. 
Traugott 2012). However, while Sp/w’s proposition also profiles the intent to prevent some virtual 
comment or objection by Ad/r, nonetheless, Ad/r is no longer a specific interlocutor (s/he could be 
anyone). It also worth mentioning the research strand of interactional linguistics, where ‘shared 
understanding’ (Linell & Lindstrom 2016) through communicative exchanges are tackled dialogically 
as context-depended strategies such as turn-parts of repair, reaction or expansion to achieve a socially 
shared cognition (Schlegoff 1991, 1992)   
 All in all, it is no secret that intersubjectivity in pragmatics and cognitive linguistics tends to 
be ‘anchored’ to a specific author’s definition, as it is indeed challenging to view DMs like actually, 
connectives such as but or and, personal pronouns like I or spatial deictics such as this or that or 
interactional strategies of repair all as markers of the same conceptual category. An obvious question 
naturally arises from such a variety of definitions and objects of enquiry:  
 
What is not intersubjective in language?  
 
And if the answer is nothing, a second question subsequently comes to mind:  
 
If every linguistic phenomenon in a way or another can be arguably defined as intersubjective, what 
is the distinctive applicability of this concept? 
  
The answer to this needs to be necessarily methodological. In fact, while debate is indeed necessary 
for the advance of a theory, however much of the controversies revolving around this concept are 
often detached from its correspondent notion of ToM in cognitive psychology and still show a 
tendency not to tackle ‘applied’ research. Intersubjectivity in quite a number of linguistic frameworks 
has become circular, viz. primarily based on linguistic criteria that vary according to the definition of 
each author. In this sense, it is important to find a way to exploit the important insights that we can 
get from the linguistic literature on intersubjectivity and combine them in a model that can be 
operationally applied in neighbouring disciplines, e.g. cognitive psychology, forensic and social 
sciences. 
 In the next sections I discuss the desiderata for a cross-disciplinary paradigm. Among them, I 
propose to account operationally for a gradient ‘surplus approach’ to address empirically whether the 
problematisation of (an-)other mind(s) is overtly codified as redundant structure or additional element 
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to the mere ‘co-actional’ (cf. Reich 2011; Author 2016b) meaning of the utterance. From this 
perspective, the intersubjective dimension underpins all those linguistic elements that are ‘un-
necessary’ for the simplest propositional realisation of a communicative act (entailing a basic ‘co-
action’), but which are needed to communicate the awareness of a specific addressee or a general 
third party’s potential reactions to the utterance.        
   
4. Co-actionality vs. communicated intersubjectivity 
 
This section respectively focuses on the related notions of co-actionality and communicated 
intersubjectivity (cf. Author 2017b). The former draws on the evolutionary approach to linguistic acts 
as co-act proposals proposed in Reich (2011, 2012) and accounts for linguistic behaviour 
underpinning any shared activity or joint project (cf. Clark 1996) with a peer. Co-actional engagement 
regards ‘interested’ target-oriented speech events involving at least 2 agents and clearly may be 
performed without marked functions signalling the awareness of Ad/r's emotions or beliefs.  
 For instance, an agent may be interested in reaching the salt on a dining table with the help of 
someone sitting nearby. Whatever the utterance chosen by Sp/w, the two interlocutors will be 
involved in the co-action having to do with Ad/r passing the salt to Sp/w. Yet, Sp/w does not 
necessarily need to codify his/her awareness of Ad/r's state of mind while formulating the utterance: 
e.g. Pass me the salt; Could you please pass me the salt?; Salt, and so on. While all of these are co-
act proposals (cf. Reich 2011; Author 2016b) underpinning joint attention and a shared activity among 
agents, however not all of them encode a marked attempt to problematise Ad/r’s state of mind. Simply 
put, not all of them communicate a process of “thinking about thought” (Apperly 2010: 76; ). In fact, 
it is noted that “humans all have a competence to make sense of the observed behaviour of others, a 
competence shared with many other animals” (Schaafsma at al. 2015: 65). Communication occurring 
as co-actional behaviour is proved to be possible in both low and high levels of the autistic spectrum 
(e.g. Happe 1995; Grant, Riggs & Boucher 2004; Bowler & Benton 2005). Infants and children 
younger than 3 are shown to be able to engage in dialogic and/or behavioural activities involving joint 
attention (e.g. O’Neill 1996; Moll & Tomasello 2007). That being said, “simply knowing that 
someone’s mental state differ from one’s own is not necessarily the same as being explicitly aware 
of what the other person’s mental state is”. (c.f. Schneider et al. 2014, Bradford et al. 2015: 23). 
Explanations of successful performance in object-choice tasks based on social-cognitive capacities 
such as shared intentionality (Tomasello, 2008) and bodily mimesis (Zlatev, 2008; Zlatev et al. 2013) 
assume that these capacities precede language, in both hominid evolution and child development. 
 In light of these facts, a gradient redefinition of intersubjectivity as an ‘overtly codified’ 
dimension seems necessary. From the perspective of usage-based linguistics, it is both a theoretical 
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and a methodological advantage to analyse ToM as an overtly codified phenomenon. ToM becomes 
marked as overt attempt to problematise a peer's emotions or beliefs and can thus be distinguished 
from mere attentional and behavioural ability in engaging in a co-action. It thus makes sense to 
propose that ToM is linguistically communicated when Sp/w spontaneously (i.e. not prompted by an 
‘in-lab’ stimulus) finds necessary to encode his/her awareness of Ad/r's as a distinctive effort or 
‘surplus’ over mere target-oriented meaning: e.g. actually I’m a bit tired now vs. I’m tired (now) (cf. 
Traugott & Dasher 2002 on the intersubjective functions of the discourse markers actually and a bit 
of2). As an illustration, it is beyond doubt that an imperative construction such as Look! establishes 
joint attention among the interlocutors. However, it is not purposely employed to problematise Ad/r's 
emotions or beliefs as when it is used as an intersubjectified attention-giving device (e.g. Romero 
Trillo 1997; De Clerk 2006: 168): 
 
(3) Look! 
BNC KB1 5112  
(4) Look Dani. You don't know what you're speaking about. 
 (Van Olmen 2010: 228) 
 
In (4) Look is propositionally redundant at the co-actional level (e.g. it does not change the 
perlocutionary effects of the utterance and can be both semantically and grammatically omitted). 
However, from the point of view of Sp/w, look in (4) is needed at the intersubjective level: it allows 
Sp/w to overtly account for the negative impact of the utterance towards Ad/r’s ‘positive face’ (cf. 
Brown & Levinson 1987). It is reasonable to expect a child younger than 4 being able to utter the 
former expression (3), while it is not farfetched to imagine the latter usage in (4) being ‘cognitively’ 
mastered at a later stage of language acquisition. The mismatch between (3) and (4) brings up a 
fundamental question of polysemy as diachronic stratification of meaning and the online ability of an 
individual to master different ‘meaning potentials’ (Norén & Linell 2007; Linell & Lindstrom 2016: 
125) of the same construction. Crucially, semasiological change shows a tendency to develop ad-hoc 
functions of intersubjectivity (e.g. Traugott & Dasher 2002): in the case above (4) is a reanalysed, 
comparatively more recent function of look than (3), which, in turn cannot be omitted as a surplus 
element over the propositional, target-oriented meaning of p. 
 The ‘surplus approach’ draws especially from politeness theory and reciprocity in social 
psychology and pragmatics (cf. Kasper 1990; Culpeper 2011; Author et al. 2017). It is based on the 
premise that the problematisation of another agent’s ‘face’ is cognitively more demanding than mere 
                                               
2 It is acknowledged that redundant language is of prime importance in an analysis of the performance of speech events 
and social awareness of ritualised behaviour (cf. Rizza 2009) 
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action-oriented communication, as it is shown that thinking about other people mental states requires 
more time and executive functioning both in children and adults (e.g. German & Hehman 2006; 
Apperly 2008). Addressed from a usage-based angle, the surplus approach needs to be necessarily 
corpus-driven, based on data converging from ontogenetic development and language change. It is 
centred on co-actionally ‘redundant’ constructions or syntactical ordering that start being mastered at 
a comparatively later stage of first language acquisition with the overt purpose of accounting for 
(an-)other mind(s). It tackles operationally the gradient relationship between ‘interested’ intentions 
and sedimentation (cf. Husserl [1936]1970; Zlatev & Blomberg 2016) of linguistic knowledge, which 
in turn, allows to overtly codify the awareness of other individuals’ stances, emotions and beliefs. 
The latter are addressed as ad-hoc strategies or constructions that are cognitively more demanding 
than ones that are merely centred on co-actional, speaker-oriented endeavour. 
 For instance, in the case of (1) actually and I wouldn't mind it staying are both a codified 
surplus over the same propositional, per-locutionary oriented meaning (cf. Searle 1969; Searle & 
Vanderveken, 1985) that could be communicated with less cognitive processing (cf. Grice 1976 
maxim of quantity; Sperber & Wilson 1995; Wilson & Sperber 2004: 609): leave it open; don’t close 
it; no or any other unmarked formulae directly encoding a directive speech act at the co-actional level 
with a clear per-locutionary effect: window still open. Developmental stages of ‘thinking of thought’ 
are characterised by the awareness that one’s individual desires may be a possible threat for one’s 
own and others’ face needs (e.g. Brown & Levinson 1987; Yu 1997). The social clash between 
interested ‘language-for action’ and the awareness of Ad/r's face is the dimension where ToM comes 
into play as a gradient mechanism of ‘codified awareness of the other(s)’. In this sense, the surplus 
element of an intersubjective construction needs to be one that Ad/r can identify as additional effort 
over meaning that exclusively codifies ‘subjective’, viz. merely speaker oriented intentions.  
 As pointed out in the previous sections, a directive speech act such as leave it open is beyond 
doubt based on joint attention, yet it still lacks a ‘constructional’ surplus that is necessary to overtly 
problematise the online awareness of Ad/r or 3rdP’s mind(s). This is clearly not to say that here Sp/w 
would be necessarily showing a deficient ToM ability. Rather, that from an operational point of view, 
there would be no overt indication of communicated intersubjective awareness being accountable in 
a corpus-based analysis (cf. McCafferty 1998; Mori & Hayashi 2006 for alternative embodied, non-








5. From co-actional joint-attention to extended intersubjectification 
 
This section aims at putting the ‘surplus-approach’ into practise and to crucially combine ontogenetic 
and diachronic data to identify intersubjectivity as an overt effort triggered by the awareness of 
an(other) mind(s). 
 
5.1 The case of this, that and such 
 
In recent accounts, so-called identifying and intensifying usages of the pre-nominal such have been 
discussed diachronically, especially in connection with the intersubjective dimension. Ghesquiere & 
Van de Velde 2011 (2011: 771) suggest that attested usages at the beginning of the cline of such are 
characterised by a textual-identifying function. They propose an intersubjective interpretation based 
on the argument that such semantically contributes to establish joint attention with Ad/r. Similar 
identifying functions of such are still widely in use in Present-day English as in the example below: 
 
(5) The teaching of mixed-ability classes becoming the norm must be avoided at all  
 costs. Very marginal benefits come from such teaching and the system must allow  
 for some form of streaming. 
(CB Times 1990 –1996) 
(Ibid.) 
 
The identifying function in (5) helps Ad/r to determine the type of which the NP referent is an instance 
(e.g.  Carlson 1978: 219; Ghesquiere & Van de Velde 2011: 772). Identifying usages of such thus set 
up phoric relations in the discourse connecting the NP referent with the referent of another preceding 
(anaphoric) or following (cataphoric) NP.  
 Drawing on Bolinger’s (1972) hypothesis, Ghesquiere & Van de Velde (2011) provide 
corpus-based data from Old up to Present-day English, arguing for a new intensifying function of 
such (hereby, INT–such). Despite not providing diachronic cases of intensifying usages, they 
illustrate the mismatch with the identifying such synchronically: 
 
(6) It used to be such a thrill when you saw English cars on the road had to negotiate a  
 serious low point in his training career.  
(CB Times 1990 –1996) 
 
(7) It’s not just that it played such an important part in my life, but the fact that the  
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 nurses and doctors there do such terrific work.  
(CB Times 1990 –1996) 
(Ghesquiere & Van de Velde 2011: 783) 
 
Examples (6-7) above are not phoric as they do not encode reference to either a preceding or ensuing 
element of the discourse. They are rather intensifying (hereby INT–such) as they heighten “the degree 
of a certain evaluative or scalar notion inherent in the modified element” (cf. Ibid: 7682). The authors 
therefore suggest that the INT–such encodes a subjective meaning and thus constitutes a 
counterexample to the unidirectional cline of change towards intersubjectivity proposed by Traugott 
(e.g. 2010: 34). The diachronic formation of new polysemies is especially relevant for the present 
study, as they constitute ‘meaning potentials’ (Norén, K. & Linell 2007; Linell & Lindstrom 2016: 
125) that can be associated with a certain word or construction. Inspired by the call for a new ‘applied’ 
turn of language emergence and language change (cf. Ellis & Larsen-Freeman 2006; MacWhinney 
2006), a crucial hypothesis of the present approach is the idea that intersubjective polysemies of the 
same construction or lexeme are spontaneously mastered at comparatively later stages of ontogenetic 
development. This is clearly not to say that the same clines of change that we can observe 
diachronically within a speech community are replicated unidirectionally throughout the process of 
first language acquisition of a single child. More reasonably, I propose that overtly intersubjectified 
functions of the same linguistic form are mastered only after stage of ontogenetic development where 
the child is able to intentionally rely on a ToM ability.   
 
5.2 An operationalization of the ‘hybrid’ approach to intersubjectivity  
 
While it has been acknowledged that phonological reduction and morphosyntactic change are not 
reliable criteria for comparing diachronic and ontogenetic change, yet striking similarities have been 
observed for what concerns unidirectional patterns of semantic-pragmatic reanalysis (Diessel 2011), 
as they involve similar mechanisms of change (Ziegler 1997) or similar adaptive behaviours (Givón 
2009). Crucially, contemporary research on intersubjectification can be informed by experimental 
findings about the ontogeny of ToM and help formulate a gradient, more elaborate redefinition of the 
intersubjective paradigm. ToM is today often argued to become more sophisticated through middle 
childhood and adolescence (Epley et al. 2004; Dumontheil et al. 2010), and in most recent accounts 
is viewed as a gradient ability that keeps developing far beyond early ontogeny up to adulthood (cf. 
Apperly 2013). Correspondingly, there appears to be a significant correlation between competence 




 The gradient account of intersubjectivity proposed here aims at capturing usage-based 
tendencies towards increasing complex verbalisation of ToM mechanisms converging from language 
change and ontogenetic development. The English section ranging from 0 up to 6-year-olds of the 
CHILDES database comprises 4,689,215 tokens. Among those, such occurs 85 times (2.88 per milion 
words, henceforth pmw). This number is significantly lower than other deictic markers with an 
identifying function such as this (63,225 times; 2,144.60 pmw) or that (89,276 times; 3,028.30 pmw), 
both of which semantically underpin joint attention (e.g. Diessel 2006). From the CHILDES, this and 
that are first used by the age of 1 year and 8 months (e.g. corpus Bates/keith20, hereby abbreviated 
as 1;8), while only one identifying usage of such (therefore ID-such) has been found in spontaneous 
interaction before the age of 4 (3 years 11 months, hereby abbreviated as 3;11). On the other hand, 
intensifying functions of such (from now on given as INT-such) are already attested by the age of 2 
(2;2). Below are given three examples of this tendency: 
 
(8) MOT:  Try right there ! try right there ! Want to stack them for me ? 
 CHI: That baby! 
 MOT: Oh. Did you say baby? 
CHILDES/Bates/Betty20 
Age: 1;8 
(9) CHI: She mustn't jump up on the cot. She might break the cot. Helen's got such a  
  bad cold. Get a bite off this one, too.  
CHILDES/Haggerty 
Age: 2;7 
(10) CHI:  I don't think there any are witches. 
 FAT:  Why? 




From the above, it clearly appears that joint attention is already encoded with that by a 1 year old 
child in (8). The earliest case of INT-such in (9) is uttered by the age of 2. On the other hand, the first 
instance of an ID-such is the one in (10) and it is uttered almost at the age of 4. Table 1 below reports 
the raw frequency of all the instances where such is found up to the end of the third year of age (0-3 




 2;2–2;7 2;8–3 3;1–3;7 3;9–3;11 Tot 
Intensifying 5 8 2 2 17 
Identifying 0 0 0 4 4 
Singing/imitating/reported 3 2 4 3 12 
Tot 8 10 6 9 33 
 
Table 1. 
Usages of such from the CHLDES up to the end of the 3rd year of age  
 
Table 1 above includes intensifying and identifying usages together with a third category where 
children are either singing an already known song or imitating what their interlocutors are saying. In 
the same group are also included instances that children ‘allegedly’ uttered, yet not directly recorded 
during their conversations. In all cases above, children are not spontaneously or independently 
making use of such and will not be considered as reliable instances of use. Despite the relative low 
frequency of such in the 0-3 span of the CHILDES, 2 facts clearly emerge from table 1: 
 
1. Children seem to be able to master intensifying usages of such since early  
 stages of 2Y3.     
2. Children do not spontaneously use such with an identifying function before  
 approaching 4Y. 
 
Interestingly, from 4Y up to 6Y, such then occurs 52 times (1.80 pmw) with a much more even 
distribution between intensifying and identifying usages (4-6 subcorpus counts 1,442,956 words): 
 
 4–4;11 5–5;11 6–6;11 Tot 
Intensifying 19 5 6 30 
Identifying 15 4 2 21 
Singing/imitating/reported 0 0 1 1 
Tot 34 9 9 52 
 
Table 2. 
Usages of such from the CHLDES from the 4th up to the end of the 6th year of age  
                                               




What is specifically distinctive of this data-set is the increased frequency of ID-such, which after 
being normalised across the two subcorpora, results statistically significant across the 0-3 and the 4-
6 periods (Fisher exact test p<0.005). Ontogenetic data from table 1 and 2 seems to support 
Ghesquiere & Van de Velde’s intersubjective classification of ID-such (as it is not mastered before 
the end of the 3rd year of age), while intensifying usages encode a comparably more subjective, 
speaker-centred meaning (at the beginning of 2Y, children already seem to use it spontaneously). 
This fact may be relevant for both synchronic and diachronic research of intersubjectivity as it 
supports the idea of patterns of usage moving against the unidirectional cline of change towards 
intersubjectification proposed by Traugott (e.g. 2010).  
 However, what still needs to be clarified is the argument for considering ID-such as an 
intersubjective construction ‘per se’. In fact, despite what is suggested by Diessel (2006) and 
Ghesquiere & Van de Velde (2011), joint attention alone cannot be a factor, as deictic functions of 
this and that are attested to be acquired towards the end of 1Y. What is now at stake is thus the 
distinctive intersubjective construal (if any) that children need to master at the end of 3Y in order to 
spontaneously make use of ID-such. The main aim of the following subsection is to address this 
research question both on a methodological and a theoretical level. 
 
 5.3 Inferential assumptions about the social persona’s mind 
 
Spoken language among adults is characterised by a significantly more frequent usage of ID-such in 
comparison with INT-such. Out of a random sample of 100 collocates of such from the dialogic-
spoken section of the BNC only 29 occurrences are of the INT-such type, while 71 belong to the ID-
such category. From early childhood towards adulthood there seems to be an increasing tendency of 
such being used with an identifying function. As mentioned earlier, ID-such is inherently phoric, as 
it can refer to a previous or forthcoming element of the discourse. It expresses a categorial meaning, 
which can alternatively expressed with the construct [the kind of NP (that) P4]. The latter occurs only 
3 times in the 0-3 section of the CHILDES: 
 
(11) MOT: That's gonna be very funny tea. 
 CHI: That’s the kind of tea that I'm making for them. 
 MOT: (Be)cause they like that kind of tea. 
 CHILDES/Suppes/Nina54 





(12) FAT: Whoops 
 CHI:   This is the kind of mustard that you like. 
 FAT: Really? 
CHILDES/Gleason/Isadora 
Age: 3;7 
(13) MOT:  What’s that ? 
 CHI: That’s the kind of food that they eat.  
 MOT: You mean pancakes? 
   CHILDES/Suppes/Nina55 
Age: 3;8 
 
All the three examples above occur during the third year of age. In each case [the kind of NP] always 
has to do with inferences of what Ad/r or a 3rdP may ‘like’. It defines a category that is informed by 
a mindreading mechanism, i.e. inferring about what someone specific likes, drinks eats. The 
frequency of the same construction then rises sharply up to 143 collocates during the 4–6 year span, 
significantly shifting from 0.85 pmw in the 0–3Y subcorpus to 99.1 pmw in the 4–6Y subcorpus.  
 In figures 1 and 2 below are given respectively: 
 
 - the pmw frequencies of this and that in the two subcorpora 0–3Y and 4–6Y  
 - the pmw frequencies of INT–such, ID–such and [the kind of NP] in the two  
 subcorpora 0–3Y and 4–6Y: 
 
Figure 1. 






Normalised frequencies of INT–such, ID–such and [the kind of NP] in the 0–3Y and 4–6Y sections 
from the CHILDES 
 
While comparing figure 1 and 2 above, it is possible to observe a reverse tendency: in figure 1 the 
pmw frequency of co-actional identifiers this and that dramatically decreases from 0–3Y to 4–6Y, 
whereas in figure 2 the opposite occurs for INT-such, ID–such and [the kind of NP]. Most 
intriguingly, the mismatch across the two subcorpora between INT–such and the latter two 
constructions (ID–such and [the kind of NP) is statistically significant (Fischer Exact Test, p 0<0.5). 
This means that, across 3Y and 4Y, the process of acquisition of ID–such and [the kind of NP] seems 
to both start and develop at an exceptionally rapid rate, viz. significantly faster than the acquisition 
of INT–such.  
 Once again, concerning ID–such and [the kind of NP] there seems to be a specific element 
that contributes to the way children merge inferential classifications and ToM mechanisms. In fact, 
both ID–such and above usages of [the kind of NP] involve generalised instantiations, viz. 
abstractions “involving instances of a given type” (Langacker 2009: 9) allowing users to establish 
mental contact “through the mediation of fictive or virtual entities conjured up for that purpose” 
(Langacker 2005: 170). Figure 3 below illustrates the schematic relationship between ‘experiential’ 
instances of an entity (X1, X2, X3), which are then projected into a categorical space, where the same 






Generalised instantiations (Langacker 2009: 10) 
  
Generalised instantiations of the kind given in (11-12-13) all inherently involve both the effort to 
infer another mind’s state together with the awareness of an abstract 3rd party (3rdP) functioning as 
a social persona who could confirm the generalised nature of the referent. In this sense, the ‘extended’ 
awareness of 3rdP is the semantic element that is crucially missing in deictic constructions that simply 
encode joint attention such as this or that. At early stages of ontogeny, meanings of deictics are 
inherently co-actional, in the sense that they require attention of an interlocutor to pursue a speaker-
oriented project, e.g. reaching a toy, not wanting the milk and so on. Conversely, it is reasonable to 
assume that ID–such or [the kind of NP] are acquired later for they involve a categorisation process 
underpinning a social meaning and and flexible reasoning about new mental models (cf. de Ruiter et 
al. 2018). They problematise a particular mental state based on the assumption of what a general one 
(3rdP) would agree upon. 
 In cases of ID–such and [the kind of NP] given below, a subjective proposition p, a 3rdP-
oriented proposition Q together with an Ad/r-oriented proposition R are at issue: 
 
(14) CHI: Aren't they long nails ?  
 FAT:  Yeah. 
 CHI:  What do why do they have to have such long nails?        
 FAT:  I don’t know. 
Childes/Macwhinney/79b1  
Age: 4;9 
P: I think the nails we are referring to are long.  (Subj) 
Q: I know 3rdP would agree that those nails are long. (3rdP) 
R: I expect Ad/r to be aware of what I and 3rdP think. (Ad/r)     
 
(15) CHIa: That's different. 
 CHIb: Maybe it was the kind of mud that sticks to you. 
 CHIa: No it doesn’t. Just stays on your clothes. 
   
Childes/Carterette/First 
Age: 6 
P: I suspect the mud we are referring to is sticky. (Subj) 
Q: I know 3rdP experienced something similar before. (3rdP) 




As a generalised instantiation, the choice of ID–such in the examples above encodes a ‘surplus’ of 
intersubjective awareness over mere co-actional choices of this/that. In fact, while such semantically 
entails the identifying meaning of this/that, however it cannot simply encode joint attention without 
entailing the extended problematisation of 3rdP:  
 
(16) MOT: I didn't xxx there's a bug. What bug? 
 CHI: There’s no such thing as it went that way. 
Childes/Hall/Mig  
Age: 4;6 
 a. *CHI: there’s no such thing as it went *such way. 
  
(17) MOT:  What are you doing ? 
 CHI: Sleepin(g) on that chair.  
Childes/Bates/George28 
Age: 2;4 
 a. *CHI: Sleepin(g) on *such chair. 
 
(18) CHI: Look at this book Cathy! 
 CHI: Look!- 
 INV: Ah! Oh that's a really good one. 
Childes/Belfast/Barb08  
Age: 3;2 
 a. *CHI: Look at *such book Cathy! 
 
Examples (16-17-18) above illustrate that ID-such cannot replace deictic meanings merely encoding 
co-actional joint attention among interlocutors. In fact, in addition to its identifying function, it ID–
such semantically encodes a ToM process of categorisation based on what CHI expects 3rdP’s mind 
would support or confirm, thus encoding extended intersubjectivity (E-I), as illustrated symbolically 





Extended Intersubjectivity (cf. Author, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017a, 2017b)  
 
 
Figure 4 indicates that, beyond the awareness of a specific interlocutor (Ad/r), E-I constructions 
require the additional construal of a general 3rdP as a social bearer of the utterance, viz. a general 
persona who could confirm Sp/w’s proposition. The semantic mismatch between co-actional joint 
attention and inferential assumptions of extended intersubjectivity is what may determine the abrupt 
propagation of ID-such and [the kind of NP (that) P] constructions towards the end of the 0–3Y and 
the whole of 4–6Y subcorpora.  
 
5.4 Pre-nominal identifiers from 0 to 9 years of age 
 
Increasing identifying strategies based on extended intersubjectivity require a process of 
categorisation. The focus of this section is thus on the mechanisms that lead to the usage-based 
increase of constructions like ID–such or [the kind of NP] at a relatively late stage of ontogenetic 
development. Similarly, it is important to shed light on why this tendency significantly correlates 
with the sharp decrease of use of the predominantly co-actional deictics this/that. This can be 
addressed with a distinctive collexeme analysis (cf. Gries and Stefanowitsch 2004a; Hilpert 2006) 
and a behavioural profile account (e.g. Gries 2010; Gries & Otani 2010; Jansegers & Gries 2017) of 
all variables intervening in the codification extended intersubjectivity (this will be discussed in 5.6).  
 Distinctive collexeme analysis draws on collostructional analysis (e.g. Stefanowitch & Gries 
2003; Gries 2015). It is based on a bidirectional statistical independence tests (i.e. the Fisher exact 
test), which shows whether the co-occurrence frequency is significantly different from what one could 
expect under the assumption of no association (the null hypothesis). It can be used to compare the 
distinctive attraction among two (or more) competitive lexemes (hereby defined as collexemes) with 
a construction (or collostruct) in different periods of time. While this method is often used in historical 
linguistics, this study extends its application to ontogenetic data. While simple chi-square tests or 
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logistic regression models could equally be applied to the present data, collostructional analysis is 
specifically centred on the potential attraction between the internal constituents of a construction and 
the construction itself. This model is theoretically more compatible with the usage-based hypothesis 
that ‘older’ children would show new ToM abilities by increasingly associating such with identifying 
constructions underpinning extended-intersubjectivity (E-I). This tendency will be compared with 
other identifying (this, that) and intensifying (very) constructions that do not include an E-I meaning 
potential.  
 First, it is necessary capture the degree of attraction or repulsion of the collexeme [this] within 
the collostruct [this NP] as opposed to [ANY-OTHER-ID5] (given as other in table 6) appearing in 
the [ANY-OTHER-ID NP] collostruct in each periodised sub-corpus. 
 
 obs freq this obs freq other exp freq this exp freq other pref. occ coll. strength 
0–3 9733 129580 9065.40 130247.59 this 32.50 
4–6 4037 61144 4241.47 60939.52 other 4.26 
7–9 707 17275 1170.12 16811.87 other 54.32 
 
Table 6.  
Distinctive collexeme analysis of [this] vs [ANY-OTHER-ID]6 
 
In table 6 above the two competitive variables [this] vs [ANY-OTHER-ID] have been measured 
through the 3 subcorpora 0–3, 4–6 and 7–9. With the premise that in distinctive collexeme analysis 
collostructional strength values that are higher than 1.3 are considered significant, we con observe a 
distinctively high value (32.50) of this as a collexeme of the [ID NP] collostruct during the 0–3 time-
span. Crucially, after the fourth year of age, the ‘competitor’ [ANY-OTHER-ID] is then significantly 
attracted to the [ID NP] collostruct. This value then increases dramatically during the 7–9 time-span 
(54.32). Here, it is fundamental to note the degree to which the distinctive use of this in identifying 
constructions is then progressively counterbalanced by alternative pre-nominal identifiers. This fact 
seems to further illustrate an increased cognitive complexity of the [ID NP] schematic construction 
as such, rather than a more diverse choice of lexical items which could fill the [ID] node (i.e. the 
logdice vaules of pre-nominal identifiers display similar lexical items in the three subcorpora). An 
                                               
5 Identifier. 
6 As for the output from R, in table 8 are given the observed frequencies (obs freq) of the two variables, their expected 




even more striking tendency (0–3: that; 4–6: other; 7–9: other) emerges from the co-actional that as 
a collexeme of [ID NP]:      
 
 obs freq that obs freq other exp freq that exp freq other pref. occ coll. strength 
0–3 11452 127861 9928.29 129384.70 that 153.93 
4–6 3853 61328 4645.19 60535.80 other 47.71 
7–9 550 17432 1281.50 16700.49 other 132.49 
 
Table 7. 
Distinctive collexeme analysis of [that NP] vs [ANY-OTHER-IDENTIFIER NP] 
 
While during the 0–3 period that is distinctively attracted to [ID NP] to an extremely large degree of 
collostructional strength (153.93), from the 4–6 period on, [ANY-OTHER-ID] is distinctively 
preferred as a collexeme ranging from 47.71 (4–6) to a striking 132.59 (7–9).     
  
5.5 ‘Ad-hoc’ generalizations and extended intersubjectivity: A collostructional  
 account  
 
This section is concerned with the usage-based increase of identifying pre-nominal constructions of 
generalised instantiation: [ID–such NP] [the kind of NP that P] in comparison with any other 
identifying function throughout the first 9 years of the CHILDES. This is to be compared with 
distinctively subjective pre-nominal intensifying constructions [INT–such NP], [a very NP]. In so 
doing, it should be possible to contrast the usage of predominantly subjective [INT NP] schemas 
(where INT corresponds to an intensifier) to comparably more intersubjective [3rdp-ID NP] ones 
(where 3rdp-ID corresponds to a generalising identifier construing Sp/w’s inference based on 
extended intersubjectivity (E-I), e.g. generalising functions such as: the kind of mud that sticks to you; 
there is no such thing as witches).   
 In tables 8 and 9 below is given the distinctive collexeme analysis of respectively [INT–such 
NP] and [a very NP] as opposed to any other [a(n) AdjP NP] construction occurring without a pre-
adjectival intensifier: 
 obs freq such obs freq other exp freq such exp freq other pref. occ coll. strength 
0–3 17 7725 18.49 4787.51 other 3.53 
4–6 30 4776 18.52 4787.47 such 3.04 





Distinctive collexeme analysis of [INT–such NP] vs [a(n) AdjP NP] 
 
 obs freq very obs freq other exp freq very exp freq other pref. occ coll. strength 
0–3 3116 7803 2068.77 8850.23 very INFINITE 
4–6 56 4866 932.55 3989.45 other INFINITE 
7–9 15 965 185.68 794.32 other 68.7 
 
Table 9. 
Distinctive collexeme analysis of [a very NP] vs [a(n) AdjP NP] 
 
From both tables above there seem not be any correlation between age-beyond-4 and marked use of 
INT–such or very as intensifiers of indexical [a(n) Ajd NP] constructions. In fact, the collostructional 
strength of INT–such in the 7–9 sub-corpus is below 1.30103, thus not significant (p>0.5). Similarly, 
the overall computation of the collexeme very shows a significant decrease of intensifying usages 
over time. Simply put, the collostructional attraction of very to indexical [a (n) Adj NP] collostructs 
drops significantly starting from the 4th year of age. 
 More consistent is the ontogenetic trend of both [ID–such] and [the kind of NP that] as they 
both show a distinctively significant attraction to the collostruct [ID NP] only after the fourth year of 
age: 
 obs freq such obs freq other exp freq such exp freq other pref. occ coll. strength 
0–3 4 1074484 27.84 1074460.16 other 25.42 
4–6 21 65181 1.69 65200.31 such 19.30 
7–9 5 17982 0.47 17986.53 such 4.03 
 
Table 10. 
Distinctive collexeme analysis of [ID–such] vs [ANY-OTHER-ID] 
 
 obs freq the kind obs freq other exp freq the kind exp freq other pref. occ coll. strength 
0–3 3 1074485 13.92 1074474.08 other 11.15 
4–6 8 65194 0.84 65201.16 the kind 6.34 





Distinctive collexeme analysis of [the kind of NP that] vs [ANY-OTHER-ID] 
 
This point is important to show that there seems to be a direct correspondence between children’s 
ability to make independent, ‘ad-hoc’ and context-bound generalisations and ToM as a mechanism 
going beyond simple co-actional engagement. This tendency is consistent throughout the 4-9 year-
old time span and significantly not at play before the 4th year of age. In line with this trend, it is 
possible to observe a significant decrease of more subject-oriented intensifying usages intersecting 
with indefinite indexicality [a(n) INT NP]. 
 
5.6 ‘Ad-hoc’ generalisations and extended intersubjectivity: A behavioural profile  
 account  
 
While the distinctive collexeme analysis in 5.5 compares intensifying and identifying usages of such 
across the first 9 years of age in a discrete manner, this section gives a more holistic account of the 
intersection of the ability of making generalised instantiations and ontogenetic intersubjectification. 
To do so, it is necessary to control variables that contribute to the codification of extended 
intersubjective meanings: co-actionality and abstraction (viz. whether the speech event occurs in the 
form of a physical co-action, whether the referent is visually present during the speech event), 
complexity (how many verbs are included in the construction and the verb types that are present in 
the main clause), reference (specific vs generic) and additional intersubjective and meta-discursive 
components (the number of personas being accounted for in the utterance and whether some 
additional discourse marker collocates with the construction).  
 All these variables have been included in a behavioural profile analysis (BPA) (e.g. Gries 
2010; Gries & Otani 2010; Jansegers & Gries 2017) of the constructions such, this, that, [kind of NP 
that] and very in in order to find clusterings of resemblance through the child’s ontogenetic 
development. The object of this enquiry are three schematic functions: co-actional identification (this, 
that), intensification (very, INT-such) and E-I identification (the kind of NP, and ID-such).   
 BPA allows allows for the inclusion of different forms of constructions as well as very many 
different kinds of co-occurrence information (morphological, syntactic, semantic, functional, etc.). In 
addition, it integrates different levels of statistical analysis, ranging from simple 
frequencies/percentages via correlations up to hierarchical cluster analyses and, by way of extension, 
logistic regression compatible with exemplar-based models (Gries 2010: 325). What distinguishes 
this method from traditional corpus-based analysis, is that it goes beyond the mere comparison of 
frequencies across corpora/data-sets. Rather, it is designed to identify holistic patterns of context, 
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meaning and form deriving from clusterings that are based on ‘behavioural’ similarity of linguistic 
forms. The focus of the present case-study is on data-driven convergences of meaning potentials of 
such at different stages of ontogenetic development. More crucially, it aims to show whether the 
usage of such becomes increasingly similar to [the kind of NP] and comparatively different from co-
actional functions of this and that. 
 The annotation of all constructions exceeding 200 occurrences in each corpus (e.g. this, that, 
very) was the result of a three-step process: first, the annotation of the profiles of a 200 collocates 
random sample, and subsequently the multiplication of the 200 annotated strings until reaching the 
overall frequency of that particular construction in the corpus (e.g. 16,831 for this in the 4–6Y section, 
with the remaining 84 occurrences being obtained after a second random-sampling from the 200 
annotated occurrences). Finally, despite normalisation is not generally required in BPA analysis, due 
to the considerably different size of the three subcorpora of the CHILDES and the above sampling 
technique, all annotated profiles have been normalised using the first sub-corpus 0-3Y as a reference 
(the object of normalisation were the observations rather than the frequencies of the lexemes). Table 
12 below provides the entry of one profile (this case is such) out of 42319 annotated entries relative 
to the 4-6Y period.  
 
ID-tag sight verb-type co-action verbs reference personas DM 
such sight be abstract 1 generic 2 0 
 
Table 12. 
Input for BP analysis of such, this, that, very and [the kind of NP that] for each age-span  
 
 
Below is given a comparison between the cluster analysis of respectively all annotated profiles for 0-
3Y and 7-9Y age-spans. Silhouette widths values compare within and between cluster similarities: 
“the higher an average silhouette width for a particular cluster solution, the better that cluster 





Dendogram resulting from the BP analysis for the 0-3Y age-span  
 
The silhouette widths on the y-axis are plotted against all possible numbers of clusters for 5 elements 
on the x-axis. The plot on the right hand-side includes black vertical lines and a grey step function 
for the averages, viz. the higher the value (0.51), the more accurate the number of clusters, which in 
this case is 2. Interestingly, the distance between [kind of NP that] (first cluster) is the greatest from 
mostly co-actional identifiers this and that, which are part of the second cluster, also including very 





Dendogram resulting from the BP analysis for the 7-9Y age-span  
 
In the 7-9Y age-span such directly forms a separate cluster with [kind of NP] suggesting a higher 
behavioural resemblance with constructions that are specifically aimed at construing generalised 
instantiations.   
 The BP analysis across all three year-spans is best represented through a multidimensional 
scaling algorithm (MDS) which transforms a distance matrix into a set of coordinates for each profile 





Multidimensional scaling of the BP similarity of the 5 constructions across the 3 age-spans   
 
The bubble-chart above accounts for degree of profile-resemblance (x and y axes) and normalised 
frequency (expressed by the bubble-size) across the three age-spans 0-3Y, 4-6Y and 7-9Y. It 
illustrates a most revealing tendency of such (dark blue) to move in the direction of [kind of NP that 
P] (purple) across the three periods. Both constructions increase their distance from co-actional 
identifiers this and that, as well as the markedly subjective intensifier very, showing the child’s 
increasing ability to employ such in order to construe generalised instantiations based on extended 
intersubjectivity (see variables controlling for both elements in table 12).     
 These results support Ghesquiere & Van de Velde’s remarkable intuition (2011) of the 
intersubjective nature of ID–such as opposed to the more subjective INT–such, as identifying 
functions of such become increasingly more prominent between the 4th and the 9nth year of age. 
However, this study also shows that the intersubjective meaning of the ID–such is not merely due to 
co-actional joint attention, bur rather to the ability to construe ‘ad-hoc’ generalised instantiations 
based on extended intersubjectivity (E–I), viz. the socio-cognitive ability to problematise what a 
general 3rdP would act, feel or think in a specific context. Early stages of E-I construals can shed new 
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light on the ontogenetic process of acquisition of social cognition. Corpus-based data focusing on 
‘surplus’ of meaning over co-actional engagement may inform a new gradient understanding of ToM 




This paper proposed a gradient and cross-disciplinary approach to the usage-based study of 
intersubjectivity. It draws from the experimental literature in cognitive psychology and combines it 
with corpus-based data from language change and ontogenetic development. This method is based 
on the idea that theory of mind (ToM) is overtly communicated as a ‘surplus’ of meaning that is 
additional to individual per-locutionary effects (cf. Searle 1969; Searle & Vanderveken, 1985) of an 
utterance. This entails that intersubjectivity can be operationally analysed as a gradient dimension 
underpinning linguistic elements that are ‘unnecessary’ for the simplest propositional realisation of a 
communicative act (viz. entailing a basic ‘co-action’), but which are necessary for communicating 
the awareness of an addressee’s or a third party’s potential reactions to the utterance. This model 
allows to distinguish different degrees of intersubjective awareness, ranging from co-actional 
engagement – merely underpinning joint attention – to more complex and inferential mindreading 
mechanisms impinging on immediate and extended intersubjectivity. The present case study showed 
that the pre-nominal such ontogenetically shifts from comparatively more subjective meanings, to 
more sophisticated identifying functions in which a general social persona’s mind (3rdP) is 
semantically encoded. The surplus approach to ‘co-actional’ vs ‘intersubjective’ communication may 
contribute to a new ‘applied turn’ of corpus-based research in ToM and ontogenetic development. 
Similarly, it aims at informing theoretical research on intersubjectivity with a cross-disciplinary 
method of enquiry.             
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